A Reddit discussion about quantum-safe proof-of-control for early Bitcoin addresses has surfaced a real and underexplored tension in crypto markets: how do you manage systemic risk around dormant wallets when the cryptographic assumptions protecting them may not hold indefinitely? The post that sparked the conversation is straightforward enough in concept: rather than requiring Satoshi Nakamoto, or whoever controls the earliest Bitcoin addresses, to actually move coins to prove ownership, a cryptographic mechanism could allow a proof-of-control to be published on-chain without triggering a transaction. No coins move. No market panic. No legal scrutiny attached to a wallet that has been dormant since 2009 and 2010. The idea drew 58 points and 15 comments within four hours of posting on r/CryptoCurrency, which is a modest engagement number but a meaningful signal given the specificity of the topic. The people engaging with it are not casual observers. They are thinking seriously about a problem that the broader market has not fully priced yet. The quantum risk backdrop is what makes this more than identity theater. Post-quantum cryptography has moved from academic concern to active standards work over the past three years. NIST finalized its first set of post-quantum cryptographic standards in 2024, and the conversation in security research has shifted from whether quantum computers will eventually threaten elliptic curve cryptography to when, and what the migration path looks like for systems that cannot simply patch their way to safety. Bitcoin is one of those systems. The protocol uses ECDSA signatures, and addresses derived from public keys that have been exposed on-chain, meaning any address that has ever sent a transaction, are theoretically vulnerable to a sufficiently powerful quantum adversary that could derive private keys from public keys retroactively. Most early Bitcoin addresses fall into this vulnerable category, because the public keys are