Keys used in many blockchains are “almost an order of magnitude smaller” than those protecting RSA systems at comparable security levels, meaning a less powerful quantum computer could break them. This vulnerability extends beyond cryptocurrencies to critical infrastructure relying on elliptic curve cryptography, including secure boot processes and web traffic encryption. The work highlights that current resource estimates for quantum attacks haven’t kept pace with advancements in quantum algorithms, and systemic weaknesses in areas like stablecoins and tokenization remain unexplored. Researchers aim to provide a more comprehensive picture of these risks, hoping to spur discussion within both the financial and quantum computing communities. Quantum Computers Threaten RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography The efficiency of Shor’s algorithm presents a dual threat to current cryptographic standards, specifically targeting both the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptography, impacting a broad spectrum of secure systems reliant on these methods. This algorithmic vulnerability extends beyond traditional data security, creating risks for protocols like Transport Layer Security (TLS), which currently supports a 521-bit elliptic curve for encrypting and authenticating HTTPS traffic; a quantum attack on this protocol may necessitate a larger, though not necessarily definitive, computational barrier. While a switch to a larger modulus, such as a 1024-bit system, might offer temporary protection for blockchains, its effectiveness hinges on detailed understanding of scaling limitations within leading quantum computing platforms. The vulnerability of elliptic curve cryptography also manifests in specific blockchain implementations, such as Mimblewimble, a privacy-focused protocol used by Litecoin; the introduction of stealth addresses and ECDH key exchange, intended to facilitate offline secret derivation, introduces points of failure susceptible to quantum attacks. Pedersen commitments and the ECDH key exchange protocol, both integral to Mimblewimble’s functionality, are demonstrably vulnerable, further compounded by the use of fixed public parameters in the elliptic curve points employed for