In his 1966 book Men, Machines, and Modern Times, Etling E. Morison offered what would become a classic study of how people and organizations learn, or fail to learn, to live with innovation. One of my favorite vignettes is his account of an early World War II artilleryman acting as a “horse holder,” standing as if to calm the team of horses during firing, even though the gun was now pulled by a truck. The absurdity of that remnant of battlefields past comes to mind as leaders envisage how geospatial intelligence is produced—and leveraged—in the age of autonomy. Over the past forty-five years, I have closely followed how innovations in geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT, and its predecessor fields have served the warfighter. The field has changed over the years to follow technology trends and warfighter needs, but the current pace of change is faster, broader, and more consequential. To keep pace, a new evolution—what I call autonomous GEOINT—must emerge as the next, necessary step to continue supporting warfighting on the rapidly emerging autonomous battlefield. Building upon the definition of GEOINT in 10 US Code § 467(5), today GEOINT provides warfighters with the locations of US forces, coalition partners, adversaries, and noncombatants. It helps predict movement by accounting for natural and human-made obstacles. The advantage GEOINT affords battlefield leaders goes beyond describing what, where, and when; it also helps to address how and why. My experience with the transition from the Defense Mapping Agency to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Army’s shift from topographic engineering to geospatial engineering suggests that technology is often not the hardest problem. While both of these transitions were compelled by significant technological and warfighting changes, the harder problem was how people accepted the changes, adapted to new organizations, and created doctrine to make new capabilities