Post-quantum cryptography: Why organizations should prepare now Post-quantum cryptography: Why organizations should prepare now With post-quantum standards emerging and regulatory expectations evolving, organizations need to understand their quantum-related risks and prepare for a secure transition. event 20-08-2026 Share Quantum computing could unlock significant advances across science, technology and industry. At the same time, sufficiently capable quantum computers would undermine many of the public-key cryptographic methods that organizations rely on to secure communications, authenticate users and systems, and verify the authenticity of software. The challenge for organizations is no longer only when cryptographically relevant quantum computers will arrive. It is whether the systems, data and technology investments they rely on today can remain secure throughout a multi-year transition. That transition has already begun. Post-quantum standards are available, the EU has established milestones for a coordinated migration, and Traficom guidance emphasizes early, risk-based preparation. For many organizations, the immediate task is not to replace every cryptographic mechanism. It is to identify where vulnerable cryptography is used, understand which critical use cases depend on it, determine what must be protected first and avoid creating new cryptographic legacy. Cryptography is a hidden business dependency Public-key cryptography is an invisible foundation of the digital economy. Methods such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography support secure web traffic, virtual private networks, digital certificates, user and machine authentication, email security, electronic signatures and software updates. If these methods become vulnerable, the impact will extend beyond data confidentiality. Organizations could face risks to digital identities, the authenticity of digitally signed information and the mechanisms used to establish trust between systems. One significant concern is the integrity of software and firmware updates. If an attacker can forge a trusted publisher’s digital signature, the update process itself may become an avenue for compromise. The risk also begins before sufficiently capable quantum